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ABSTRACT 
 
Prior studies have demonstrated that foreign firms co-locate with immigrants from their home countries, 
but whether this improves profitability is unclear. We show that co-national immigrant communities 
positively affect the performance of foreign firms, but that there is significant heterogeneity in this effect 
depending on the type of firm (entrepreneurial venture or MNC subsidiary) and manager (immigrant 
versus local). We find that the immigrant community has a much stronger effect on the profits of foreign 
entrepreneurial firms when they are managed by an immigrant vs. a native CEO. Conversely, MNC 
subsidiaries derive equal benefits from co-locating with immigrants regardless of their CEO’s nationality. 
This is consistent with our expectation that entrepreneurial firms have a greater need to be locally 
embedded and rely more on their local managers’ personal networks to derive benefits from local 
communities, whereas subsidiaries can derive such benefits based on the established organizational 
resources of the MNC.  
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Understanding what drives the performance of foreign firms is a fundamental issue in global 
strategy. An emerging literature has pointed to the role that immigrants may play in the foreign expansion 
process of firms from the immigrant community’s home country and demonstrated that foreign firms tend 
to locate in regions with large co-national communities (e.g., Hernandez 2014; Iriyama, Li, and 
Madhavan 2010). This work has suggested that common nationality provides the basis for social capital 
by which firm can tap into the supply- or demand-side resources of immigrant communities (e.g., Gould 
1994; Hernandez 2014; Kalnins and Chung 2006). We seek to address two unanswered issues in that 
literature. First, it is unclear whether co-location with home-country immigrants improves foreign firm 
profitability or whether such co-location is due to inherent differences that make some places attractive to 
both foreign individuals and foreign firms (e.g., Kulchina 2016a). Some anecdotal evidence even suggests 
that locating in places with a strong presence of co-national immigrants may hurt performance by limiting 
firms’ chances to grow profitably (Bartlett and O’Connell 1998; Dawar and Chandrasekhar 2009). Our 
study contributes to this debate by providing systematic evidence that immigrants have a positive effect 
on firm profitability, and that they do so by both lowering costs and increasing revenues.  
Our second contribution is to demonstrate that there is meaningful heterogeneity across firms in 
whether and how they benefit from the immigrant community. Prior studies on the relationship between 
immigrants and foreign location choice have focused primarily on the average effect of immigrants across 
firms. We expect that foreign firms vary in their need to rely on local social networks for their success 
and that they have differing ability to develop social capital with the local immigrant community. We 
focus on two groups of firms that differ in this regard: foreign entrepreneurial businesses and subsidiaries 
of multinational corporations (MNCs). We define a foreign entrepreneurial venture as a firm owned by 
one or more non-native individuals and an MNC subsidiary as a firm owned by another foreign firm. 
These two kinds of firms likely benefit from co-national immigrant communities in distinct ways because 
subsidiaries can rely on the reputation, capabilities, and global network of the MNC while entrepreneurial 
ventures need to rely more on the social embeddedness and resources of individual entrepreneurs and 
managers (Dahl and Sorenson 2009; Kulchina 2016b). Moreover, we anticipate that a firm’s ability to 
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benefit from co-national immigrants also depends on the nationality of its local CEO—an immigrant 
versus a native of the host country—because it affects the extent to which the firm is able to embed itself 
within and obtain resources from the immigrant community. Our argument is that the need and ability to 
relate to the local immigrant community will interact with each other, such that subsidiaries and 
entrepreneurial firms will benefit differently from immigrants and the magnitude of this difference will 
depend on the nationality of the CEO. 
We tested these ideas on a sample of foreign firms operating in Russia between 2006 and 2011. 
These firms are distributed across 85 regions, each varying significantly in the size of immigrant 
populations of different nationalities. Taking advantage of the uniqueness of Russian vs. non-Russian 
names, we were able to identify whether the CEO of each establishment was an immigrant or a native 
Russian. To address endogeneity concerns, we exploited two exogenous shocks to the size of local ethnic 
communities: the inflow of foreign labor to the construction sites of the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum in Vladivostok and of the Olympic Games in Sochi.  
We found that immigrants had a significant positive effect on firm’s profitability (operating 
ROA) and verified that both lower costs and higher revenues drove this effect. There was significant 
heterogeneity across types of firms. Entrepreneurial firms benefited the most from the size of immigrant 
community if they were managed by a co-national immigrant CEO. The positive impact of the immigrant 
community on the profits of subsidiaries of MNCs did not depend on the nationality of the local CEO: 
they benefited from immigrants regardless of whether the CEO was an immigrant or a native Russian. 
The effects on entrepreneurial firms managed by immigrant CEOs were particularly pronounced for firms 
operating in trade and services and in regions where Russians have low trust of foreigners or rely more 
heavily on social networks. These findings are consistent with the notion that, compared to MNC 
subsidiaries, entrepreneurial firms have a greater need to be socially embedded in a local community and 
rely more strongly on the social capital of their managers to derive the benefits of co-locating with 
immigrant communities. 
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This study contributes to the literature in various ways. First, it speaks to the central issue in 
global strategy: how firms can succeed in foreign markets. By demonstrating that immigrants have a 
positive effect on firm profitability, it addresses the debate of whether foreign firms actually benefit from 
co-ethnic communities or simply co-locate with them for idiosyncratic reasons (Hernandez 2014; Iriyama 
et al. 2010). Moreover, our results reveal a significant difference in the impact that immigrants have on 
MNC subsidiaries compared to foreign entrepreneurial ventures, thereby emphasizing the importance of 
considering firm heterogeneity in the immigrant-performance relationship. Second, our findings on the 
role of immigrant CEOs inform a rapidly growing literature on managing multinational ventures and the 
costs and advantages of having foreign versus domestic managers (Ghemawat and Vantrappen 2015; 
Kulchina 2016b; Mezias 2002; Sonkova and Karim 2013; Zhou 2014).  
Our findings also speak to a set of broader issues. We bring together the literatures on MNCs and 
foreign entrepreneurs (which have previously been developed in parallel) and highlight the distinct 
mechanisms by which each can benefit from social communities in foreign markets. Our paper further 
informs research on the social embeddedness of firms. Unlike some studies that equate the social ties of 
the entrepreneur to the social ties of the firm (e.g., Dahl and Sorenson 2012; Shane and Stuart 2002), our 
work suggest that the ability of an entrepreneurial venture to benefit from the local community strongly 
depends not only on who founds the firm, but also on who operates it. In contrast, established firms such 
as MNCs seem capable of deriving benefits from local communities based on organizational rather than 
individual factors. Thus our work contributes to the broader research on how different types of firms 
acquire and benefit from social capital (e.g., Sorenson and Rogan 2014).  
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
The performance of foreign firms has long been a question of scholarly and managerial interest. The 
literature on this topic is typically rooted in the assumption that foreign entrants suffer from a liability of 
foreignness—a relative lack of knowledge, influence, or legitimacy compared to domestic incumbents 
(Hymer 1976; Zaheer 1995). Hence research emphasizes factors that help firms overcome these 
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disadvantages as drivers of foreign firm performance. While these factors can take on many forms, they 
can be categorized as local resources (Harris 1954; Wheeler and Mody 1992), certain capabilities or 
knowledge unique to the focal firm (Hymer 1976; Kogut and Zander 1993), and unique networks that 
provide some kind of preferential access to resources or useful knowledge (Johanson and Vahlne 2009). 
Recently, scholars have taken note of the presence of an immigrant community of the same nationality as 
the foreign firm as a potentially valuable factor that helps overcome the liability of foreignness by 
providing access to resources, knowledge, and social networks.  
Interest in the relationship between immigration and the international activities of firms began 
with studies showing that migration increased trade between pairs of countries (Combes, Lafourcade, and 
Mayer 2005; Gould 1994; Head and Ries 1998; Rauch and Trindade 2002). Subsequent studies found that 
immigration affects foreign direct investment (FDI) at the country level (Bandelj 2002; Buch, Kleinert, 
and Toubal 2006; Foad 2012; Leblang 2010). These macroeconomic effects were important precedents 
for international strategy scholars because firms are the primary vehicles of trade and FDI (UNCTAD 
2006). Thus in recent years studies at the firm level have shown that the presence or size of an immigrant 
community is a significant predictor of foreign location choice for firms from the same home country as 
the immigrant group (Hernandez 2014; Iriyama et al. 2010). The empirical regularity, in both country- 
and firm-level studies, is that co-location between immigrants and a firm of the same nationality is 
common. 
 The crucial but still unanswered question from a strategic standpoint is whether co-locating with 
immigrants is beneficial for firm performance. Evidence on performance effects is sparse. Kalnins and 
Chung (2006) demonstrated that entrepreneurial firms owned by immigrants survived longer when 
located near firms owned by immigrants of the same ethnicity. Hernandez (2014) showed that 
subsidiaries of multinationals had higher survival rates when located in states with higher shares of 
immigrants from the same home country among the total population. Rangan and Sengul (2009) provided 
evidence that subsidiaries had higher sales in countries where the local population historically originated 
from an ethnicity similar to the population of the home country, but it is less clear to what extent this 
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effect is driven by immigration vs. other historical relationships between home and host country 
correlated with similarity in ethnic composition. While prior evidence suggests that there may be an 
association between some aspects of foreign firm performance and the presence of home-country 
immigrants, such association does not necessarily translate into positive overall firm profitability, nor 
does it indicate a causal effect of immigrants on firm performance. Immigrant populations are small 
relative to the native population and may not be the most profitable segment of the market to serve, or the 
knowledge and other resources they offer may not be relevant for operating in the local environment. 
Indeed, some anecdotal evidence has suggested that managers are aware of these limitations when 
considering co-locating with immigrant populations (e.g., Bartlett and O’Connell 1998; Dawar and 
Chandrasekhar 2009). And since most of the evidence has focused on location choice rather than 
performance outcomes, it could be that immigrants and firms locate in the same places for spurious 
reasons.  
 Conceptual arguments for why immigrants can help firms become more profitable have been 
made by a variety of scholars. Immigrants can help firms through supply or demand effects. On the 
supply side, immigrants can enable firms of the same nationality to obtain resources such as labor and 
capital at lower costs (e.g., Kalnins and Chung 2006; Kulchina 2016b) or transfer valuable knowledge 
across locations more effectively (Kerr 2008). On the demand side, immigrants may directly be customers 
of the focal firm or can create demand for the firm’s products (or brand) among the native population 
(Gould 1994). One mechanism underlying both demand and supply effects is access to knowledge—the 
ability of immigrants to help firms learn about opportunities, resources, and “ways to do things” in the 
host location. Further, this knowledge (and other resources) is made available through the social networks 
typical of immigrant communities, which span both the home and the host countries (Levitt 2001). 
Perhaps most crucial is that access to the resources (broadly defined) offered by an immigrant community 
tends to be restricted—or at least is given preferentially—to those who share the nationality or ethnicity 
of the population, such as firms owned by those from the same home country (Hernandez 2014). 
Common nationality also allows a firm to become socially embedded with the immigrant community and 
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derive the benefits of social capital frequently discussed in the literature (Granovetter 1985; Kalnins and 
Chung 2006). Consistent with these arguments, we predict that: 
Hypothesis 1: The size of an immigrant community will have a positive effect on the profitability 
of firms from the same home country located in the host location. 
 
While establishing an effect of immigrant communities on foreign firm performance is an 
important step, there is likely to be significant firm heterogeneity behind the relationship. Exploring that 
heterogeneity can be valuable to better understand the mechanisms by which immigrants benefit firms 
and the conditions under which those mechanisms are activated. The bulk of the arguments proposing a 
performance effect, which we just reviewed, build on the notion that co-nationality between the firm and 
the immigrant community is valuable because it allows the firm to become socially embedded within the 
community and hence obtain some kind of preferential access to its resources, consumers, or network 
connections. We thus expect that one of the main sources of firm heterogeneity worth exploring is the 
focal firm’s need and ability to be socially embedded with the immigrant community.  
We consider two related factors that drive such need and ability: whether the foreign firm is 
owned by an MNC or an entrepreneur and whether an immigrant or a native CEO manages the firm. The 
juxtaposition of these two factors creates four types of firms operating in the foreign location, as 
illustrated in Figure 1: (A) an MNC subsidiary managed by a native CEO, (B) an entrepreneurial firm 
managed by a native CEO, (C) an MNC subsidiary managed by an immigrant CEO, and (D) an 
entrepreneurial firm managed by an immigrant CEO. We explore how the impact of the immigrant 
community on performance differs for these types of firms. We are using the term “immigrant” broadly: 
the immigrant CEO could be a permanent resident of the host country or a manager on assignment from 
the parent firm (e.g., an expatriate). While permanent residents and other types of foreign residents have 
technically different types of immigration status, we use the term “immigrant CEO” for consistency and 
to express that the manager is from the same country of origin as the focal firm’s owner. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
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Firms owned by foreign entrepreneurs, such as an American opening a coffee shop in Russia or a 
Korean establishing a software development firm in the United States, have grown into a significant 
phenomenon. Foreign-born individuals now constitute almost a quarter of all entrepreneurs in the U.S., 
employ almost five million people, and earn over half a billion U.S. dollars in revenue annually (Fiscal 
Policy Institute 2012). Similar trends are observed in Europe and other regions (e.g., Centre for 
Entrepreneurs and DueDil 2014; Segreti 2009).  
One key difference between foreign subsidiaries and foreign entrepreneurial firms lies in how 
much they need to be embedded within the local community. Prior literature demonstrates that 
entrepreneurial firms traditionally rely more strongly on the local community to sell their products as well 
as to obtain supply-side resources and market information than larger, multi-location organizations (e.g., 
Dahl and Sorenson 2009; Hallen 2008, Sorenson and Audia 2000; Uzzi 1996). In order to reach these 
local communities, entrepreneurs take advantage of their personal networks and social capital, regardless 
of whether they start firms in their home countries or in foreign ones (Dahl and Sorenson 2009; Portes 
1987). The need to rely on personal networks is much stronger for entrepreneurs than for subsidiaries of 
established firms because entrepreneurs usually do not have access to other channels through which they 
can link to the local community. For instance, they lack the brand name and reputation of an established 
organization, do not have established marketing and sales channels or the support of a parent firm, and 
have no corporate financial guarantors in the eyes of suppliers and investors.  
 These considerations underscore another important distinction between entrepreneurial and large 
firms: not only do the former rely more heavily on the local community, but the locus of the social capital 
by which they relate to the community differs. Social capital and networks are often attributed to 
organizations, which is likely correct in the case of firms with an established history, reputation, or brand. 
But Sorenson and Rogan (2014) argue that social capital frequently belongs to specific individuals within 
an organization, and we suggest that this is especially the case for entrepreneurial firms without a known 
track record (Kalnins and Chung 2006). Since in an entrepreneurial venture the CEO is often personally 
responsible for many essential firm tasks—such as negotiating with investors, finding suppliers and 
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consumers, and hiring employees—the CEO’s personal network becomes as important as or more 
important than that of the entrepreneur. Therefore, the personal connections of the CEO should strongly 
influence how the firm becomes embedded with the community.  
Whereas all entrepreneurial ventures need to become socially embedded within the local 
community, which subset of the community they embed into may vary. In the case of a foreign 
entrepreneurial firm, whether the appointed CEO is an immigrant or a native becomes important when 
considering the extent to which the firm’s profits are affected by co-national immigrants. We expect that 
an immigrant CEO will have stronger ties to the immigrant community from his or her home country, 
whereas a native CEO will better relate to a community of local nationals. Indeed, Kulchina (2016b) 
demonstrates that immigrant managers of entrepreneurial firms are better able to attract cost-efficient co-
ethnic labor than native managers of similar foreign ventures. More broadly, appointing an immigrant 
manager may bring the advantage of tapping potentially valuable resources from the co-ethnic 
community, while appointing a native manager may be more useful in reducing the liability of 
foreignness and getting access to domestic investors, suppliers, or consumers.  
The performance outcomes of having each type of manager are likely to depend on the size of the 
co-national immigrant community in the host location because that determines in what community the 
entrepreneur must become embedded. In the absence of an immigrant community, a native CEO can be 
especially helpful to enhance the performance of an entrepreneurial firm because the native will have 
higher levels of social capital within and knowledge about supply and demand conditions in the host 
market. An immigrant manager would exacerbate the disadvantages of foreignness in the eyes of the 
native population because the manager is not embedded within the community and the firm lacks other 
“organizational” resources such as reputation, branding, or history to overcome the manager’s lack of 
social capital. However, the greater the size of an immigrant community in the host location, the more 
valuable an immigrant manager’s personal network becomes. The immigrant community will be more 
important to the fate of the firm, serving as the basis to obtain customers, employees, and other resources, 
 9 
or simply as a “mediator” between the firm and local buyers and suppliers. This should be manifested in 
the following empirical observation: 
Hypothesis 2: The size of an immigrant community will have a more positive effect on the 
profitability of co-national entrepreneurial firms if they are managed by an immigrant CEO than 
if they are managed by a native CEO. [D > C in Figure 1a] 
 
 Like foreign entrepreneurial firms, subsidiaries of MNCs face a liability of foreignness that an 
immigrant community can help ameliorate. In the eyes of the immigrant community, MNCs are well 
known because of prior interactions in the home country. Immigrants may serve as customers for the 
MNC, or be employed by it, or simply be aware of the firm. This is particularly likely for MNCs because 
they tend to be the largest and most visible firms in their home countries. While that recognition exists in 
the eyes of the co-national immigrant community, it does not always exist in the eyes of the native (host 
country) population. Hence, immigrants can provide direct benefits as well as be a helpful link between 
the subsidiary and the local market, as argued by the research we cited in support of Hypothesis 1.  
But as mentioned earlier, subsidiaries have at their disposal means to engage with the local 
immigrant community that are tied to the reputation and global network of the parent firm instead of the 
individuals managing the firm. Multinational organizations are frequently able to rely on a globally 
recognized brand name or quickly establish credibility with local co-ethnic stakeholders by appealing to a 
long history of successful operations in other markets (Ettenson 1993). Indeed, the theory of the MNC 
suggests that such intangible assets are frequently the very reason for foreign expansion (Buckley and 
Casson 1976; Hymer 1976). Further, while local resources or customer markets are important for 
subsidiaries, these firms are part of a global network of other MNC units that frequently provides them 
with demand- or supply-related benefits. For example, a subsidiary may obtain a certain raw material 
available in the host country but not need to sell the resulting product in the local market because its client 
is another subsidiary of the MNC in a different country (i.e., an export-oriented operation). Alternatively, 
a subsidiary may still sell goods in the local market but use formal marketing and distribution channels 
established by the parent firm instead of relying on immigrants. Or the subsidiary may sell in the local 
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market but import the product and hire employees from MNC headquarters (i.e., an import-oriented 
operation).  
In short, subsidiaries have a lower social and geographic dependence on the local community 
compared to entrepreneurial firms. And in the process of relating to the local immigrant community, 
subsidiaries have lower dependence on the social networks of their top managers than entrepreneurs. 
These considerations would be consistent with the following two empirical results: 
Hypothesis 3: Being managed by an immigrant vs. a native CEO will have a stronger positive 
effect on the relationship between the size of the immigrant community and profitability for co-
national entrepreneurial firms than for subsidiaries of multinational firms. [(D - C) > (B - A) in 
Figure 1a] 
 
Hypothesis 4: The size of an immigrant community will have a more positive effect on the 
profitability of co-national entrepreneurial firms managed by an immigrant CEO than on the 
profitability of co-national subsidiaries of multinational firms managed by an immigrant CEO. 
[D > B in Figure 1a] 
 
Taken together, hypotheses 2 through 4 imply that, among the four combinations of foreign firms 
in Figure 1a, foreign entrepreneurs with immigrant CEOs should experience the largest benefits from the 
size of the local co-national immigrant community. 
Hypothesis 5: The size of an immigrant community will have the strongest positive effect on the 
profitability of co-national entrepreneurial firms managed by an immigrant CEO compared to 
the other three types of firms. [D > A, B, C in Figure 1a] 
 
Data and Variables 
Sample: We empirically tested our ideas on a sample of foreign firms that operated in Russia between 
2006 and 2011. The firm-level data came from the Ruslana database owned by Bureau van Dijk (BvD), 
which provides establishment-level financial and operational data as well as the names of managers and 
information on each establishment’s owners. Ruslana is part of the Amadeus and Orbis databases 
managed by BvD, which have been extensively used by researchers (e.g., Belenzon, Berkovitz, and Rios 
2013; Bloom, Kretschmer, and Van Reenen 2011; Kulchina 2016b). The Russian setting has several 
characteristics important for our study. First, Russia is a large country with many regions, which vary 
significantly in terms of immigrant populations. Second, the BvD database provides detailed financial, 
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ownership, and top management information on all foreign firms operating in Russia, including 
subsidiaries of foreign corporations and private businesses founded by foreign entrepreneurs. Finally, the 
uniqueness of Russian names helps determine whether top managers of foreign firms are Russian or 
foreign. In a preliminary analysis (not shown, available from the authors on request) we verified that the 
size of the co-national immigrant community had a positive and significant effect on the location choices 
of foreign firms in Russia—similar to research conducted in developed market settings (e.g., Hernandez 
2014; Iriyama et al. 2010). 
Our dataset consists of 23,489 firms with at least 50 percent foreign ownership and at least one 
year of financial data, and for which we were able to identify whether the CEO was an immigrant or a 
native Russian for all years with financial data. To construct this sample, we first excluded firms that 
were operated by a management company (0.2% of the initial sample). The remaining firms had 
individuals as CEOs. For 19 percent of firm-year observations, CEO nationality was listed in the 
database. For the remaining firm-year observations, we took advantage of the uniqueness of Russian 
names to identify the immigrant status of the CEO.
1
 We excluded from our identification procedure some 
countries whose nationals may have names that are similar to typical Russian names, such as Ukraine, 
Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Moldova, and Kazakhstan.
2
 We use firms from these countries only 
when their managers’ nationalities are listed in Ruslana. 
Of the firms in the final sample, 65 percent are wholly owned foreign firms. Furthermore, 79 
percent of the firms are MNC subsidiaries, and 21 percent are owned by foreign entrepreneurs. In line 
with prior literature, we define an entrepreneurial firm as one that is owned by one or several individuals 
(Aldrich and Waldinger 1990; Sørensen 2007). In the sample, 17 percent of the firms are operated by an 
immigrant CEO and 83 percent have a Russian CEO. Immigrant CEOs come from the home countries of 
                                                          
1
 Similar approaches, inferring the nationality or foreign ownership from names, have been broadly used in the 
management literature (e.g., Foley and Kerr, 2013; Kalnins and Chung 2006).  
2
 This explains why our final sample has a disproportionally smaller share of firms coming from the former Soviet 
Union republics. Firms with non-missing CEO data are slightly larger, more profitable, and somewhat older than 
other firms. However, in most cases the magnitudes of the differences are very small. We also confirm that the main 
effect of immigrants on firm performance is replicated in a complete sample of firms. 
 12 
their firms. The shares of foreign and Russian CEOs vary significantly for subsidiaries (11% and 89% 
respectively) and foreign entrepreneurs (42% and 58% respectively). In regard to Figure 1, our sample 
consists of 16,546 MNC subsidiaries with Russian CEOs; 1,957 subsidiaries with immigrant managers; 
and 2,887 and 2,099 foreign entrepreneurial ventures with Russian and immigrant managers, respectively. 
The sectoral distribution of the sample is as follows: 37 percent of firms are engaged in services, 36 
percent in retail and wholesale trade, 14 percent in manufacturing, 7 percent in construction, and 6 
percent in other industries. Firms originate from the following regions: Eastern Europe (33%), Western 
Europe (28%), Asia (12%), North America (7%), Newly Independent States (NIS) (6%), and others 
(14%). The sample is quite heterogeneous in terms of firm age and size: the average firm in the sample is 
6 years old and has 118 employees, with entrepreneurial firms being slightly younger (4 years old on 
average) and smaller (29 employees on average).
3
  
Dependent variable: In our analysis, we examine whether the size of a co-ethnic community 
positively affects firm performance. In line with prior studies (Anderson and Reeb 2003), we use 
operating return on assets (OROA) as a firm performance measure, calculated by dividing earnings 
before interest and taxes (EBIT) by the book value of assets.
4
 
Independent variables: Our main independent variable, ln(immigrants), is the natural logarithm 
of the stock of immigrants from country j in region r in year t. Data on immigrants by region came from 
the Russian Statistical Services and are available for 1997–2011. We took the number of foreigners that 
entered region r in year t as permanent residents and constructed a stock of such immigrants by adding 
together the numbers from previous years starting in 1997, the first year for which we have immigration 
data available. Starting with 1997 does not bias our findings since the number of immigrants before 1997 
is very small. Russia became open to foreigners only in 1992, after the split of the Soviet Union, and 
immigration was scarce in the first five years due to unattractive economic conditions and undeveloped 
immigration laws. We focus on the number of permanent residents for two reasons. First, for our 
                                                          
3
 Our results hold when we limit our sample to firms founded after 1991, when Russia became open for the majority 
of foreign investors, or to firms that entered between 2004 and 2013, closer to our observation window.  
4
 The results are robust to using return on assets after interest and tax (ROA) as a measure of profit. 
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observation window, Russian Statistical Services reported the regional distribution of permanent residents 
but not of foreign workers. We expect, however, that the locations of permanent residents and foreign 
workers from the same country are highly correlated (because the majority of permanent residents are 
working people, not refugees).
5
 Second, if there is any temporary discrepancy between permanent 
residents and foreign workers, foreign firms will tend to locate near permanent residents because firms are 
founded with long-term expectations and the permanent resident community is more stable than the 
population of temporary foreign workers. Permanent residents rarely return home, so the outflow of 
permanent residents is minimal. There is also much less cross-region migration in Russia than in some 
other countries, such as the U.S., particularly among immigrants, so that cross-regional migration should 
not significantly bias our measure. 
Russia has 85 regions, which are comparable in size to U.S. states. There is significant variation 
in the number of immigrants across regions, home countries, and years. In 2006, for example, the total 
number of immigrants varied from 480 (Nenetsk Autonomous region) to 155,125 (Moscow).
6
 Cross-
regional variation in the number of immigrants is 2.5 times higher than within-region variation. Post-
Soviet countries naturally provide a larger number of immigrants, with Kazakhstan and Ukraine being at 
the top. Among other countries, the largest numbers of immigrants are from Germany, China, and Israel. 
The dummy variable entrepreneur equals 1 when a firm is founded by one or more foreign 
individuals and 0 when it is founded by a foreign company (MNC). The dummy variable immigrant CEO 
equals 1 when a firm has an immigrant CEO and 0 when it has a Russian CEO. 
Control variables: In line with prior studies of foreign firms and of firm performance (Anderson 
and Reeb 2003; Kulchina 2016a; Villalonga and Amit 2006; Wasserman 2003), we include a range of 
control variables comprising firm, home-country, and host-region characteristics that may influence the 
number of immigrants, location choice, and firm performance. These variables are described in greater 
detail when we introduce specific models of firm performance. Table 1 displays firm-level variable 
                                                          
5
 Indeed, in Russia at the national level the number of permanent residents from country j has a strong positive 
correlation with the number of foreign workers from the same country. 
6
 Our results are robust to taking out larger regions, such as Krasnoyarsk territory and Republic of Sakha-Yakutia. 
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definitions and descriptive statistics at the firm-year level. Table 2 reports correlation matrices for the key 
variables from the firm-year panel sample. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
Analyses 
Firm performance and the size of the local immigrant community: As the first step in testing our 
hypotheses, we assess whether there is a positive relationship between the performance of foreign firms 
and the number of co-national immigrants in the region. We use an OLS model to estimate the following 
equation:  
𝑂𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛(𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠)𝑗𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑛(𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑛(𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑛(𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑟𝑡 + 𝑌𝑡 + 𝐼𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 ,                                                     (1) 
 
where i is a firm, j is a home country, r is a region in Russia, Yt is a set of year of observation dummies, Ii 
is a set of industry dummies (at the two-digit level), and eit is an error term. In the baseline model, we 
control for the natural logarithms of assets, debt, firm age, and home-country and host-region gross 
domestic products (GDP) per capita in nominal U.S. dollars. Subsequent models also account for a 
number of other country and region characteristics and country and region fixed effects. Standard errors 
are clustered by country-region (clustering by firm, region, or country does not change the findings).  
 The results of the baseline model in column 1 of Table 3 point to a positive correlation between 
the performance of foreign firms and the number of co-national immigrants in a region. Increasing the 
number of immigrants in a region from zero to the sample mean of 1,034 people is associated with a 3.5-
percentage-point increase in firm OROA (for comparison, mean OROA in our sample is 4%).
7
 These 
results remain robust to the inclusion of additional country- and region-level control variables. In Model 2 
                                                          
7
 This refers to the sample mean of the raw number of immigrants instead of the logged number. For an increase 
from zero to the mean of ln(immigrants) = 4.133, the increase in OROA would be 2 percentage points. All other 
continuous variables are held at the sample mean, the year is set to 2006, and the industry code is set to retail trade. 
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we control for the number of immigrants from other countries in the host region, which is important to 
validate that co-nationality between the firm and the immigrant group, and not just the presence of any 
immigrant group, drives access to the resources of the immigrant group. In Model 3, we add country and 
region dummy variables. In Model 4, we add the following time-variant characteristics: unemployment 
rate, foreign direct investment (FDI) per capita, and inflation for both the host region and the home 
country; and crime rate, higher-education graduates per capita, R&D personnel per capita, capital 
investment per capita, and average wage for the host region. In Model 5, we use firm fixed effects and 
estimate the effect of within-firm variation in the number of immigrants. In Model 6, we add the set of 
time-variant country and region characteristics to the model with firm fixed effects. The coefficient for 
the number of immigrants is positive and significant in all models. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
While these findings suggest that foreign firms may benefit from locating in a region with a large 
co-national immigrant community, it is still difficult to interpret the evidence as causal due to potential 
omitted variable bias. For example, unobserved regional characteristics may simultaneously attract 
immigrants and positively affect firm performance.  
Exogenous variation in the size of the local immigrant community: To address the endogeneity 
concern, we would like to examine how firm performance changes when the number of co-national 
immigrants in the host region exogenously increases. In our analysis, we take advantage of an exogenous 
shock to the size of the local immigrant communities of certain nationalities in two Russian regions 
between 2008 and 2011. The shock is based on two major construction projects that attracted a significant 
amount of foreign labor from certain countries. In the late 2000s and early 2010s, Russia conducted two 
major construction projects to prepare for two large international events. One was the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum 2012,
8
 held in Vladivostok, Primorsk Territory; the other was the 
2014 Olympic Games in Sochi, Krasnodar Territory. To meet the demanding construction schedule, the 
                                                          
8
 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/APEC_Russia_2012 
 16 
Russian government lifted quotas on foreign construction workers in the two regions. These projects 
attracted a large number of foreign construction workers from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, China, 
North Korea, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Belarus, and Serbia. Many of these workers came with their 
family members, who found jobs in other industries; some workers who started in the construction 
industry gradually transitioned to other industries. We categorized these ten nations as affected countries 
relative to all other unaffected countries.
9
 
We examine whether the inflow of foreign workers had a positive effect on the performance of 
co-national firms that had entered the two affected regions before 2008. Our treated group is composed of 
firms from the affected countries and our control group contains firms from all other countries located in 
the Primorsk and Krasnodar Territories. We exclude firms in the construction industry because the 
construction boom may have directly affected their performance. The difference in differences model is 
presented in equation 2: 
𝑂𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗 × 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝐿𝑛(𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑖𝑡 + 𝐿𝑛(𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡)𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 ,   (2) 
where affected country is one of the 10 countries listed above that supplied foreign workers, post is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 for years 2008–2011, and 𝛾𝑖 is a firm fixed effect. Standard errors are 
clustered by country-region. The main effects of affected country and post time period are captured by the 
firm fixed effects and the yearly dummy variables, respectively. In line with our theoretical argument, we 
expect that an inflow of co-national foreign workers had a positive effect on the performance of foreign 
firms. First, foreign workers and their families could have served as consumers for many co-national 
firms. Second, workers’ family members, and later the workers themselves, could have become 
employees of non-construction firms. Finally, the suddenly available co-national community could have 
provided information and networks for foreign businesses. 
                                                          
9
 Firms from the affected and unaffected countries have equal pre-treatment trends and are similar on profitability, 
size, and the level of debt, but are more likely to be owned by entrepreneurs and be managed by immigrant CEOs. 
Our results remained materially the same when we used a matched sample of firms from the affected countries and 
the control group. We matched them on observable characteristics using the coarsened exact matching approach 
(CEM). More details can be found in the robustness checks section.  
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The findings in Table 4 are in line with our expectations. Firms from affected countries 
experienced a significant increase in performance during 2008–2011 compared to firms from other 
countries (see column 1). On average, their OROA increased by 4 percentage points. As a robustness 
check, we also exclude manufacturing firms, some of which might have supplied materials to the 
construction industry, and the effect remains materially the same (see column 4). We also make sure that 
our findings are not driven by firms’ anticipation of the construction boom. The first public conversations 
about the possibility of holding the Olympic Games in Sochi and the APEC forum in Vladivostok started 
in 2006, and the venues were selected in 2007 by voting during respective committee meetings. We thus 
check whether our results hold if we limit our sample to firms established in those regions before 2006, 
the year when investors and managers could first become aware of the possibility and adjust their location 
choices accordingly. The results remain materially the same (see column 5). 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
 Heterogeneity by firm and CEO type: Hypothesis 2 predicts that the size of the co-national 
immigrant community will have a stronger positive effect on the profitability of entrepreneurial firms 
when they are managed by foreign rather than Russian managers. In column 1 of Table 5, we limit our 
sample to entrepreneurial firms and find that the impact of the immigrant community has a significantly 
more positive impact on the profits of entrepreneurial firms when they are managed by immigrant 
managers than when they are managed by native ones. Interestingly, our findings imply that in the 
absence of co-national immigrants, foreign entrepreneurial firms with immigrant managers on average 
underperform similar firms with Russian managers. This suggests that an immigrant manager may 
become a liability for a foreign entrepreneurial firm when the local community is composed entirely of 
natives.  
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
----------------------------------- 
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 Hypothesis 3 predicts that the positive moderating effect of an immigrant manager will be less 
pronounced for a subsidiary. We find an even stronger effect than what the hypothesis suggested: for 
MNC subsidiaries, the positive main effect of the number of co-national immigrants on OROA in the 
region does not vary with the type of CEO (see column 2 of Table 5). Also, unlike entrepreneurial firms, 
MNC subsidiaries with immigrant managers exhibit performance similar to that of subsidiaries with 
Russian managers even in the absence of a local immigrant community. Taken together, our results in 
columns 1 and 2 are consistent with hypotheses 2 and 3.  
 In column 3, we test hypothesis 4, which predicts that a co-national immigrant community has a 
stronger positive effect on foreign entrepreneurial ventures with immigrant managers than on MNC 
subsidiaries with immigrant managers. We limit our sample to firms with immigrant CEOs and find 
results consistent with our proposition. Conversely, when we restrict our attention to firms with Russian 
managers in column 4, we find that subsidiaries and entrepreneurial firms benefit equally from the 
immigrant community. Note that the sign of the coefficient suggests that entrepreneurial ventures with 
Russian managers may receive a lower impact from immigrants, such that the effect of immigrants on 
these firms may be close to zero. However, statistically, the difference is not significant at any 
conventional level; therefore, we consider that immigrants equally affect subsidiaries and entrepreneurial 
ventures with Russian managers. 
 In column 5, we use a combined sample of foreign entrepreneurs and subsidiaries to estimate 
moderating effects on the full sample of firms. The results confirm our findings in columns 1–4. They 
also support hypothesis 5 by demonstrating that, among the four types of firms listed in Figure 1, foreign 
entrepreneurial ventures with immigrant managers experience the greatest benefits from co-locating with 
immigrant communities from their home countries. The results also suggest that an immigrant community 
benefits foreign entrepreneurs significantly more than subsidiaries when both kinds of firms hire 
immigrant CEOs. In column 6, we repeat our exercise after adding firm fixed effects and additional time-
variant country and region control variables. The findings remain materially the same. Our findings from 
Table 5 are summarized in Figure 1b. They can also be visualized by looking at Figure 2, where we plot 
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the values of firm OROA for different sizes of immigrant communities using the coefficients from model 
5 in Table 5. Control variables are kept at their means. Taken together, our results are consistent with the 
idea that the positive association between the size of the immigrant community and firm performance is 
the largest for foreign entrepreneurs with immigrant managers relative to all other similar firms.  
----------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
In Table 4, we examine the differential impact of the inflow of foreign workers due to the major 
construction projects on foreign entrepreneurial firms with immigrant CEOs. Column 2 presents the effect 
on entrepreneurial ventures with immigrant managers, whereas column 3 demonstrates the impact on all 
other foreign firms. The results suggest that foreign entrepreneurial businesses with immigrant CEOs 
received a larger benefit from the exogenous inflow of co-national workers compared to other firms. For a 
median-size entrepreneurial firm from an affected country with an immigrant CEO, this effect translates 
into an additional $4,124 of annual profit. For a comparable other firm, the increase is $1,094 per year. 
 Impact of the local immigrant community on firm cost and revenue: In this section, we test 
whether the size of an immigrant community has different impacts on the costs and revenues of foreign 
firms. This helps provide evidence of whether supply- or demand-side effects are at play in the 
immigrant-profitability relationship. Prior literature has speculated about the existence of these two 
effects but not empirically tested them (e.g., Gould, 1994). In Table 6, we examine the impact of the 
number of co-national immigrants on the firms’ cost-to-revenue and revenue-to-asset ratios. On average, 
foreign firms co-located with a large immigrant community have lower cost-to-revenue and higher 
revenue-to-asset ratios.
10
 Moreover, the immigrant community has an equal impact on lowering costs for 
both entrepreneurial firms and subsidiaries. However, immigrants have a significantly larger positive 
effect on the revenue of entrepreneurial firms with immigrant CEOs. At the same time, immigrant CEOs 
have a negative impact on the revenue of entrepreneurial firms when a co-ethnic community is absent or 
very small.  
                                                          
10
 The results also hold if we use ln(revenue) and ln(cost) as dependent variables in place of ratios. 
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Overall, our findings point to the fact that immigrant communities help firms—regardless of type—
operate more efficiently by reducing costs and increasing the productivity of assets, but foreign 
entrepreneurial firms with immigrant CEOs have an even higher increase in the revenue-to-asset ratio 
when co-locating with a co-national immigrant community. This is consistent with the idea that foreign 
entrepreneurial ventures with immigrant managers may rely more strongly on the consumption of the co-
ethnic community or on the role of the co-ethnic community in creating access to Russian consumers. The 
idea of a stronger consumption mechanism is also indirectly supported by the fact that foreign 
entrepreneurs are less likely to export their products than MNC subsidiaries and, therefore, have to rely 
more strongly on local consumption.
11
 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
Variation in the need and ability to socially connect with an immigrant community: Our 
theoretical section argues that foreign entrepreneurial firms with immigrant managers benefit strongly 
from the local co-national immigrant community because young firms need to be socially embedded 
within the local community and being managed by an immigrant CEO endows them with a strong ability 
to become socially embedded within the immigrant part of this community (but may weaken the ability to 
relate to the Russian part of it). This implies that the strong positive effect of the immigrant community 
on foreign entrepreneurial firms with immigrant managers should be even more pronounced when a firm 
has a particularly strong need to be embedded in the local community or when it is particularly difficult 
for a foreign firm to become embedded within the native Russian community. This may be the case in 
several empirically observable situations that allow us to further probe into the mechanisms we propose. 
First, we expect that entrepreneurs from former Soviet Union republics—such as Ukraine, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and others—will find it easier to relate to the Russian community relative to all other foreign 
                                                          
11
 Entrepreneurs are approximately 5 percent less likely to export their products than subsidiaries.  
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entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs from these countries have a more similar culture and background and 
typically have no or few language barriers.  
Second, we anticipate that foreign entrepreneurs will find it more difficult to embed themselves in 
the Russian community when Russian people exhibit low trust toward foreigners. We measure trust 
toward foreigners using data from the 2005 wave of the World Values Survey, where individuals were 
asked how much they trust people of another nationality as captured on a four-point scale: (1) trust 
completely; (2) trust somewhat; (3) do not trust very much; and (4) do not trust at all. We calculate the 
share of people who answered (1) or (2) out of the total number of respondents in that region.
12
 Then we 
split our sample into regions with above-median trust and below-median trust, where the median is 0.37.  
Third, access to a large social community should be more important to the success of a business 
in regions where people strongly believe that networks and relationships are important for success. We 
measure the importance of networks by using another question from the 2005 WVS: What does, in the 
individual’s opinion, bring success in life—hard work or luck and connections? The scale ranges from 1 
to 10, with the “hard work” extreme at 1 and the luck and the “connections” extreme at 10. We calculate 
an average score by every region and then once again split our regions at the median value of 5.385.  
Finally, firms operating in retail trade and services are more likely to sell their products locally 
and directly to consumers than firms operating in manufacturing. We expect that retail and service firms 
would find it more important to be accepted in the local community.  
Our results in Table 7 are in line with our theoretical arguments. We observe that, among foreign 
entrepreneurs, the coefficient for the interaction term ln(immigrants)* immigrant CEO is more positive 
for non-Soviet firms, for ventures located in regions exhibiting low trust toward foreigners and placing 
high importance on network connections or luck, and for firms in retail trade and services compared to 
those in manufacturing. While all differences between coefficients are in the right direction, only the 
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 The measure of trust and the measure of networks mentioned below are less refined than other regional measures 
because the lowest geographic unit of observation in WVS is a federal district (at the time of the survey, Russia had 
seven federal districts), which may contain several regions. Thus we may have the same measure of trust for several 
regions if they belong to the same federal district.  
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differences for trust of foreigners, the importance of networks, and industry type are statistically 
significant at a conventional level. A lack of statistical significance for the type of country may be due to 
the artificially small sample of firms from former Soviet countries
13
 and the relatively large variation in 
“Russianness” within that sample (e.g., Ukrainian culture may be more similar to Russian culture than 
that of Kyrgyzstan). Table 7 presents results only for the subset of entrepreneurial firms for ease of 
interpretation. But the findings remain materially the same if we use the full sample (including MNC 
subsidiaries) and include the three-way interaction term ln(immigrants)*immigrant CEO*entrepreneur. 
An interesting pattern in those models is that subsidiaries with immigrant managers do not exhibit the 
same differences in performance across the four conditions: Soviet vs. non-Soviet, low vs. high trust, low 
vs. high importance of networks, and retail/services vs. manufacturing. This further validates that the need 
and ability to relate to the immigrant community applies most strongly to foreign entrepreneurial firms 
managed by immigrant CEOs. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
Robustness checks: We make sure that our findings are robust to a number of sample and model 
modifications. First, our results hold when we control for the number of firms from the same home 
country located in the region (see column 1 of Table 8), which may be correlated with the size of the 
immigrant population and firm performance. When we introduce this control variable in our models with 
the construction project shocks, our results also remain materially the same (results are not reported but 
are available from the authors on request). Second, we examine whether the impact of the size of a co-
national community differs for firms where the majority of shares is owned by foreign investors versus 
firms in which all shares are owned by foreign investors. Column 2 demonstrates no significant difference 
between majority-owned and wholly owned foreign firms. Third, we confirm that the impact of the 
immigrant community is consistent across small and large firms. In columns 3 and 4, we split our sample 
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 Note that we had to exclude firms from several large former Soviet countries when identifying CEO nationality 
based on names, as nationals of those countries and Russians may have similar names. 
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into firms with fewer than 50 employees and those with at least 50 employees yet find no significant 
difference. Finally, we make sure that our findings are robust to using an alternative measure of the 
immigrant community. In column 5 we use the share of immigrants among the regional population 
(Hernandez 2014) and in column 6 the inflow of immigrants as the main independent variables and find a 
positive association between such measures and firm performance.  
 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
The findings also hold when we measure firm size as the number of employees instead of assets, 
when we control for distance between home country and host location, when we drop the most popular 
Russian region for foreign firms (Moscow), and when we eliminate country-region-year observations 
with zero immigrants.
14
 Moreover, the findings are robust to the exclusion of home countries that may 
serve as potential tax heavens, such as the Virgin Islands and Cyprus, as well as to eliminating any single 
influential home country, such as China, the U.S., Germany, or the U.K. We also confirm that we do not 
find similar effects if we use immigrants from other countries in place of own-country immigrants. 
Finally, we check if there is any difference in the main effect of immigrants for firms from the former 
Soviet Union republics (NIS) and firms from other countries given the historical relationship between 
NIS countries and Russia. Whereas the coefficient for the NIS firms is slightly smaller, the difference is 
not significantly different from zero.  
Furthermore, one may be concerned that our comparison of foreign entrepreneurial firms and 
subsidiaries is problematic because these types of firms may be inherently different from each other. To 
explore this possibility, we repeated our tests on a subsample of entrepreneurial firms and subsidiaries 
matched on key observables, such as assets, debt, age, year, two-digit industry, region, and home 
country.
15
 The findings from the matched and main samples are materially the same. We repeat the 
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 These and any other unreported results are available from the authors on request. 
15
 We use a coarsened exact matching (CEM) method (Blackwell et al. 2009). Entrepreneurial ventures and 
subsidiaries are matched in the first year they show up in our dataset. 
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matching exercise for our subsample of affected and unaffected countries in the difference-in-differences 
model from Table 4. Firms are matched in 2007 based on assets, debt, two-digit industry, and age. The 
estimation with matched firms demonstrates an even greater effect of an exogenous increase in the 
number of immigrants in the regions with major construction projects than the one that we observed in the 
unmatched sample.  
When explaining the differential impact of immigrant communities on entrepreneurial firms with 
foreign versus local managers, we relied on the expectation that these managers relate to different parts of 
local communities. Alternatively, this effect may be driven by the fact that the type of CEO is correlated 
with the type of population that firms target with their products: Entrepreneurs may hire immigrant CEOs 
when they sell products targeted to the immigrant population and employ local CEOs when their products 
better suit local nationals. However, our empirical evidence suggests that such an explanation is unlikely. 
First, we observe a distinct impact of CEO type for MNC subsidiaries, whereas if CEOs signaled 
immigrant-friendly products in entrepreneurial firms, they would also signal such products in 
subsidiaries. Second, in additional analyses we use two other variables that could proxy for the product 
type: an indicator of whether a firm imports goods from abroad and the share of foreign ownership. We 
expect that firms that import goods from abroad are more likely to sell foreign products or products 
oriented toward a foreign population. Furthermore, if local managers were associated with local products, 
a similar logic might apply to firms with joint foreign-local ownership. Foreign entrepreneurs would 
engage local co-founders if they expected to sell products targeted to a local population. Conversely, 
firms with 100 percent foreign ownership would likely carry products for foreign nationals.  
If our findings for immigrant CEOs in entrepreneurial firms were driven by the type of product, we 
would observe results similar to those using the immigrant CEO indicator when using importing behavior 
and foreign ownership share as proxies for the product type in place of the immigrant CEO indicator. 
However, when we tried to replicate our findings for immigrant CEOs using the importing dummy 
variable and 100 percent foreign ownership indicator, we got very different results (see columns 1 and 3 
of Table 9). In columns 2 and 4, we also confirm that our differential results for entrepreneurs with 
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immigrant CEOs hold when we include the importing dummy variable and the 100 percent foreign 
ownership indicator. According to this analysis, it is unlikely that our differential findings for 
entrepreneurial firms with foreign versus local CEOs are driven solely by the differences in product 
offerings. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 9 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Our objective was to assess whether immigrants help improve the profitability of firms from their home 
countries and to explore firm heterogeneity in that relationship. While prior studies have shown that 
foreign firms tend to locate close to co-national immigrant communities and suggested that such co-
location is beneficial for firms (Hernandez 2014, Iriyama et al. 2010), our paper is one of the first to 
convincingly demonstrate that such co-location positively affects firm profits. Exploiting exogenous 
variation in the supply of immigrants within our sample allowed us to address important concerns 
regarding the causality of the relationship between immigrants and firm success. This alleviates the 
concern that firms may choose to co-locate with immigrants of the same nationality for reasons unrelated 
to performance, or even for dysfunctional reasons that may undermine performance (e.g., Kulchina 
2016a). Further, the finding that the immigrant community lowers costs and increases revenues provides 
evidence that both the supply and demand effects suggested in prior work are at play (Gould 1994).  
Prior empirical work has studied how immigrants affect firms investing in developed markets, 
while we study the relationship among foreign firms in emerging markets. One may wonder how our 
findings may generalize to other institutional settings. We expect that they should hold outside of our 
sample. First, in our preliminary analysis, we verified that the influence of immigrants on location choice 
(previously found in developed countries) is also present in Russia, bolstering the generalizability of the 
results. Second, a significant part of our argument is based on the premise that entrepreneurs heavily rely 
on social networks within local communities. This phenomenon is not unique to Russia and has been 
 26 
reported in many developed countries, including the U.S. (e.g., Sorenson and Audia 2000; Uzzi 1996) and 
Denmark (Dahl and Sorenson 2009).  
Aside from speaking to the literature on immigrants directly, our work also contributes to broader 
fundamental questions about global strategy, social capital, and how firms benefit from their surrounding 
community. Understanding the drivers of foreign firm performance is the central question of the global 
strategy literature. While that work has long been rooted in the liability of foreignness, much of the early 
work focused on factors internal to the firm—especially proprietary assets or capabilities—that helped 
firms overcome that liability. The notion that the external social networks and relationships of the firm 
may also be important has gained attention more recently (Johanson and Vahlne 2009). But our 
understanding of how foreign firms gain access to and benefit from the surrounding community in their 
host markets is still limited. Distinguishing between foreign firms owned by entrepreneurs and those 
owned by MNCs has helped us delve into this issue. Moreover, our findings on the role of immigrant 
CEOs inform a growing literature on managing multinational ventures, which emphasizes the benefits and 
costs of having foreign versus domestic managers (e.g., Kulchina 2016b; Mezias 2002; Sonkova and 
Karim 2013; Zhou 2014). We demonstrate that firms that have a stronger need to rely on the support of 
the local community (i.e., foreign new ventures) but have few formal means to engage with it need a 
manager of the same nationality as the community to which they relate. Apart from entrepreneurs, this 
may also be true, for example, for subsidiaries of small or young parent firms, which have no established 
reputation and less extensive multinational supply and demand chains. 
The findings support our expectation that entrepreneurial ventures tap into the resources of the 
immigrant community through the social capital of the individuals managing the firm. Indeed, selecting a 
CEO of a nationality most relevant to the composition of the local community is essential for 
performance: entrepreneurial firms’ profits suffer if they appoint an immigrant CEO in a community 
composed mainly of natives, but this reverses as the presence of co-national immigrants in the community 
grows. Several of the additional analyses we conducted suggest that this happens because entrepreneurs 
rely on the surrounding community for supply and especially demand benefits. For instance, the impact of 
the immigrant community was particularly strong for entrepreneurial firms managed by immigrant CEOs 
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in industries that tend to sell directly to local customers (retail and services), and the revenue-enhancing 
effect of immigrants was stronger for entrepreneurial firms than for subsidiaries of MNCs. We also found 
that foreign new ventures managed by immigrant CEOs benefit most from immigrants when the native 
population exhibits low trust toward foreigners. In contrast, the impact of the co-national immigrant 
community on the profits of MNC subsidiaries is less sensitive to having a CEO of a specific nationality. 
This does not mean subsidiaries do not need or benefit from social capital. Rather, the means by which 
they activate community-based resources are more tied to organizational factors—such as the reputation 
or assets of the firm—than factors attached to the individuals within the firm. In future work, it would be 
useful to examine in greater depth the individual mechanisms through which immigrant communities 
benefit foreign firms, such as access to superior resources, increased demand, and network support and 
information. It would be helpful to understand the relative importance of these mechanisms for various 
types of firms and under different market conditions. 
Our findings also speak to the issue of organizational social capital. The literature has 
demonstrated that social relationships are essential for firms’ success because they provide superior 
access to resources and consumers and ensure preferential treatment (Bengtsson and Hsu 2015; 
Granovetter 1985; Sorenson and Audia 2000; Uzzi 1996). One issue of major concern in the literature 
today is how firms can acquire such relationships, which are frequently held by individuals rather than 
directly by business entities (Bidwell and Fernandez-Mateo 2010; Sorenson and Rogan 2014). Our 
findings demonstrate that firms can do so by leveraging the social relationships of their managers. As 
mentioned, we also provide evidence that managers’ social capital may be more important for 
entrepreneurs than MNC subsidiaries in foreign markets because the two kinds of firms differ in their 
strategic needs (e.g., reliance on local customers) and in the means available to activate the resources of 
the community (e.g., firm reputation, prior interaction in the home market). Unlike some prior studies that 
equate the social ties of the entrepreneur to the social ties of the firm (e.g., Shane and Stuart 2002; Dahl 
and Sorenson 2012), our results suggest that the ability of an entrepreneurial venture to benefit from the 
local community strongly depends not only on who founds the firms, but also on who operates it. Thus 
the hiring decisions of foreign entrepreneurs are a key strategic issue worth exploring further. 
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Our work also relates to the literature on communities, which has tended to emphasize the 
importance of the headquarters (HQ) community as a driver of firms’ choices and performance (Marquis 
2003). Studying immigrants suggests that the community surrounding the subunits of firms in foreign 
markets is important to understand firm performance. The immigrant community is also intriguing for the 
literature because it can be thought of as an “extension” of the HQ community rather than an entirely 
different foreign one. It may be interesting for future work to consider how the HQ and host market 
communities interact to affect firms’ choices and performance, as well as how attributes of the immigrant 
community (e.g., education, cohesion, process of assimilation) affect firms.  
A further contribution of the study comes from jointly considering the foreign expansion process 
of entrepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial firms. While the foreign growth of both types of firms has 
received attention, research on the two has tended to develop in parallel, with significantly less work on 
the expansion of entrepreneurial firms. One consideration suggested by our findings is that new ventures 
tend to rely even more than MNC subsidiaries on social capital and networks, making them even more 
prone to the “liability of outsidership” (Johanson and Vahlne 2009). 
In sum, we provide evidence that the effect of immigrant communities on co-national firm 
performance is likely to be causal. Further, we delve into the heterogeneity in firms’ need and ability to 
become socially embedded with the immigrant community by distinguishing between the type of owner 
(subsidiary vs. entrepreneur) and the national identity of the CEO (foreign vs. native). In doing so, we 
explore the drivers of foreign firm performance, study variation in the mechanisms by which firms 
activate social capital, and assess how the subunits of firms benefit from their local communities. 
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a) Theoretical Predictions b) Empirical Findings 
 
* Note that we predict that (D-C) > (B-A). 
 
Figure 1. The impact of co-national immigrant communities on the performance of foreign firms 
 
  
* 
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Note: Time-variant control variables are held at their means. 
 
 
Figure 2. Differential effect of the number of co-national immigrants on foreign entrepreneurial firms and 
MNC subsidiaries by CEO type 
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Table 1. Main Variablesa
 
 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max N  
OROA Operating profit (earnings before 
interest and taxes) / book value of 
assets 
0.042 0.249 -1.902 1.057 57,651 
Ln(immigrants) Logged number of permanent 
residents from the firm’s home 
country living in the region of the 
firm’s location in Russia 
4.133 2.461 0 11.349 57,651
 
Ln(assets) Logged book value of assets 16.700 3.247 8.006 27.499 57,651
 
Ln(debt) Logged debt 15.254 5.133 0 26.830 57,651
 
Ln(age) Logged years since founding 1.692 0.776 0 5.591 57,651
 
Ln(country GDP 
per capita) 
Logged GDP per capita in the 
firm’s home country (in USD) 
9.937 1.013 5.184 12.175 57,651
 
Ln(region GDP 
per capita) 
Logged GDP per capita in the 
firm’s region of location in Russia 
(in USD) 
9.463 0.701 7.288 11.805 57,651
 
Entrepreneur Dummy variable=1 for 
entrepreneur-owned firms, 0 
otherwise 
0.172 0.379 0 1 57,651
 
Immigrant CEO Dummy variable=1 for a firm 
with a non-Russian CEO, 0 
otherwise 
0.172 0.377 0 1 57,651
 
Cost/revenue Cost-to-revenue ratio 0.942 0.225 0.001 1.998 40,965 
Revenue/assets Revenue-to-assets ratio 1.595 2.724 0 25.968 57,276 
Trust to foreigners Share of people who trust 
foreigners in the location region 
0.380 0.043 0.31 0.45 54,900 
Networks Score of network reliance in the 
location region (out of 10) 
5.606 0.300 5.229 6.136 54,900 
Former Soviet Countries that are former Soviet 
Union republics 
0.057 0.232 0 1 57,651 
 
a) GDP is measured in USD; all other monetary variables are in Russian rubles. All monetary values are 
nominal. The inflation effect is captured by the year dummy variables in regression models. We 
removed outliers by eliminating the top and bottom 1 percent of observations on OROA. This 
removed observations with OROA above 106 percent and below -191 percent. The cost/revenue ratio 
does not include firms with zero revenue and outliers. We check that our results hold if we exclude 
firms with zero revenue from our OROA analysis as well. The revenue/assets ratio also excludes 
outlier firms and a few firms with missing data.  
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Table 2. Main Correlations
a
 
 
 Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) Foreign entrants 1.000         
(2) OROA -0.021*** 1.000        
(3) Ln(immigrants) 0.020*** 0.017*** 1.000       
(4) Ln(assets) 0.052*** 0.131*** -0.178*** 1.000      
(5) Ln(debt) -0.010** 0.075*** -0.137*** 0.804*** 1.000     
(6) Ln(age) -0.052*** 0.121*** -0.037*** 0.349*** 0.276*** 1.000    
(7) Ln(country GDP 
per capita) 
-0.010** 0.027*** -0.143*** 0.277*** 0.194*** 0.189*** 1.000   
(8) Ln(region GDP 
per capita) 
0.376*** -0.020*** 0.299*** -0.001 -0.066*** -0.002 0.093*** 1.000  
(9) Entrepreneur -0.138*** 0.001 0.266*** -0.353*** -0.228*** -0.215*** -0.466*** -0.093*** 1.000 
(10) Immigrant CEO -0.133*** 0.011** 0.185*** -0.102*** -0.057*** -0.033*** -0.226*** -0.019*** 0.299*** 
a) *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 3. Size of the Immigrant Community and Firm Performance
a
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Baseline Controlling 
for the stock 
of immigrants 
from other 
countries 
Country and 
region 
dummies 
Time-
variant 
controls 
Firm fixed 
effects 
Firm fixed 
effects and 
time-variant 
controls 
Dependent variable OROA OROA OROA OROA OROA OROA 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Ln(immigrants) 0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.015** 
(0.006) 
0.013** 
(0.006) 
Ln(asset) 0.016*** 
(0.002) 
0.016*** 
(0.002) 
0.017*** 
(0.002) 
0.017*** 
(0.002) 
0.029*** 
(0.004) 
0.031*** 
(0.005) 
Ln(debt) -0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
Ln(age) 0.027*** 
(0.003) 
0.027*** 
(0.003) 
0.029*** 
(0.002) 
0.028*** 
(0.003) 
  
Ln(country GDP per 
capita)  
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
0.021 
(0.014) 
-0.004* 
(0.003) 
0.021 
(0.014) 
0.020 
(0.016) 
Ln(region GDP per 
capita)  
-0.017*** 
(0.004) 
-0.009** 
(0.004) 
0.015 
(0.023) 
-0.013 
(0.011) 
0.001 
(0.020) 
-0.009 
(0.026) 
Ln(other immigrants)  -0.011*** 
(0.003) 
    
Home-country and host-
region time-variant 
control variables
b
 
    
Yes 
  
Yes 
Constant -0.021 
(0.063) 
0.021 
(0.064) 
-0.579 
(421.491) 
-0.256* 
(0.133) 
-0.613*** 
(0.236) 
-1.202*** 
(0.365) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Country dummies   Yes    
Region dummies   Yes    
R
2
/within R
2
 0.040 0.041 0.053 0.042 0.015 0.016 
N 57,651 57,651 57,651 55,465 57,651 55,465 
a) Standard errors are clustered on country-region. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 
1% respectively. 
 
b) Home-country and host-region control variables in column 4 include country unemployment rate, 
country inflation, ln(country FDI per capita), ln(region crime), region unemployment rate, region 
inflation, ln(region FDI per capita), region higher-education graduates per capita, region R&D 
personnel per capita, region capital investment per capita, and ln(region average wage). All variables 
are measured in year t. 
Sample and notes: Variation in sample size across specifications is due to differences in data availability 
for control variables.  
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Table 4. Exogenous Increase in the Number of Immigrants in Regions with Major Construction Projects 
During 2008–2011
a 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables All firms Entrepreneurs 
with 
immigrant 
CEOs 
All other firms Excluding 
manufacturing 
firms 
Firms founded 
before 2006 
Dependent variable OROA OROA OROA OROA OROA 
Model OLS DD OLS DD OLS DD OLS DD OLS DD 
Affected country*post 0.040** 
(0.018) 
0.245*** 
(0.065) 
0.065* 
(0.036) 
0.045* 
(0.024) 
0.065*** 
(0.022) 
Ln(assets) 0.060*** 
(0.014) 
0.035 
(0.028) 
0.069*** 
(0.014) 
0.056*** 
(0.014) 
0.075*** 
(0.015) 
Ln(debt) -0.022*** 
(0.007) 
-0.019 
(0.020) 
-0.025*** 
(0.006) 
-0.021*** 
(0.007) 
-0.027*** 
(0.007) 
Constant -0.565*** 
(0.160) 
-0.260 
(0.153) 
-0.738*** 
(0.237) 
-0.538*** 
(0.149) 
-0.762*** 
(0.234) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R
2
 0.043 0.103 0.052 0.039 0.056 
N 1,899 411 1,488 1,541 1,601 
 
a) Standard errors are clustered on country-region. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 
1% respectively. 
 
Sample: All models exclude the construction industry. Model 2 includes entrepreneurial firms with 
immigrant CEOs only. Model 3 includes all other firms. Model 4 excludes manufacturing firms. Model 5 
is limited to firms founded before 2006, the year of the first conversations about holding the Olympic 
Games in Sochi and the APEC meeting in Vladivostok. 
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Table 5. Subsidiaries and Foreign Entrepreneurs
a
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Entrepreneurs Subsidiaries Immigrant 
CEOs 
Russian 
CEOs 
Interaction With firm 
fixed effects 
Dependent variable OROA OROA OROA OROA OROA OROA 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Ln(immigrants) -0.002 
(0.003) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.011* 
(0.006) 
Ln(immigrants)* 
immigrant CEO 
0.012*** 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
  -0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
Ln(immigrants)* 
entrepreneur 
  0.009** 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
0.013 
(0.019) 
Entrepreneur* 
immigrant CEO 
    -0.083** 
(0.032) 
-0.088* 
(0.047) 
Ln(immigrants)* 
entrepreneur* 
immigrant CEO 
    0.014*** 
(0.005) 
0.012* 
(0.007) 
Immigrant CEO -0.073** 
(0.028) 
0.010 
(0.010) 
  0.012 
(0.010) 
0.023 
(0.018) 
Entrepreneur   -0.009 
(0.025) 
0.063*** 
(0.022) 
0.065*** 
(0.022) 
 
Ln(assets) 0.033*** 
(0.004) 
0.015*** 
(0.001) 
0.031*** 
(0.004) 
0.015*** 
(0.001) 
0.017*** 
(0.002) 
0.031*** 
(0.005) 
Ln(debt) -0.014*** 
(0.002) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.013*** 
(0.002) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
Ln(age) 0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.033*** 
(0.003) 
0.040*** 
(0.005) 
0.026*** 
(0.003) 
0.029*** 
(0.002) 
 
Ln(country GDP per 
capita) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.017 
(0.016) 
Ln(region GDP per 
capita) 
-0.023*** 
(0.007) 
-0.013*** 
(0.003) 
-0.017*** 
(0.007) 
-0.014*** 
(0.003) 
-0.015*** 
(0.003) 
-0.009 
(0.026) 
Home-country and 
host-region time-
variant control 
variables
b
 
     Yes 
Constant -0.008 
(0.089) 
0.073 
(0.045) 
-0.220*** 
(0.070) 
-0.108* 
(0.064) 
-0.108* 
(0.056) 
-1.182*** 
(0.354) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Firm f.e.      Yes 
R
2
 0.050 0.048 0.068 0.041 0.043 0.017 
N 10,010 47,641 9,902 47,749 57,651 55,465 
a) Standard errors are clustered on country-region. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
respectively. 
b) Home-country and host-region control variables in column 6 include country unemployment rate, country 
inflation, ln(country FDI per capita), ln(region crime), region unemployment rate, region inflation, ln(region 
FDI per capita), region higher-education graduates per capita, region R&D personnel per capita, region capital 
investment per capita, and ln(region average wage). All variables are measured in year t. 
Sample: Model 6 has fewer observations due to differences in data availability for some country and region control 
variables. 
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Table 6. Size of the Immigrant Community and Firm Cost and Revenue
a
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Cost Revenue Cost Revenue 
Dependent variable Cost/revenue Revenue/assets Cost/revenue Revenue/assets 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Ln(immigrants) -0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.059*** 
(0.013) 
-0.0015* 
(0.0008) 
0.037*** 
(0.012) 
Ln(immigrants)* 
Entrepreneur 
  0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.034 
(0.033) 
Entrepreneur   -0.023* 
(0.013) 
0.719*** 
(0.212) 
Immigrant CEO   0.011 
(0.011) 
-0.158 
(0.102) 
Ln(immigrants)* 
immigrant CEO 
  -0.0002 
(0.002) 
0.031 
(0.020) 
Entrepreneur*immigrant 
CEO 
  0.004 
(0.021) 
-1.087*** 
(0.374) 
Ln(immigrants)* 
entrepreneur*immigrant 
CEO 
  -0.002 
(0.003) 
0.155*** 
(0.060) 
Ln(assets) -0.025*** 
(0.003) 
-0.179*** 
(0.022) 
-0.026*** 
(0.003) 
-0.167*** 
(0.022) 
Ln(debt) 0.014*** 
(0.003) 
0.132*** 
(0.012) 
0.013*** 
(0.003) 
0.129*** 
(0.012) 
Ln(age) -0.007** 
(0.002) 
0.083** 
(0.033) 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.105*** 
(0.030) 
Ln(country GDP per capita) 0.005*** 
(0.002) 
-0.052 
(0.033) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.029) 
Ln(region GDP per capita) 0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.198*** 
(0.067) 
-0.0003 
(0.004) 
-0.163*** 
(0.057) 
Constant 1.100*** 
(0.041) 
3.854*** 
(0.787) 
1.135*** 
(0.036) 
2.745*** 
(0.678) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.069 0.085 0.069 0.089 
N 40,965 57,276 40,965 57,276 
a) Standard errors are clustered on country-region. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 
1% respectively. 
Sample: Models 1 and 3 exclude firms with zero revenue and outliers. Models 2 and 4 exclude outliers. 
We have confirmed that our main results for OROA as a dependent variable in Table 3 hold if we make 
the same exclusions as in Table 6.
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Table 7. Variations of the Observed Effects for Foreign Entrepreneurs by the Type of the Region and the Type of the Firm
a
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Variables 
Soviet Non-
Soviet 
Low-trust High-trust Low 
importance 
of networks 
High 
importance 
of networks 
Retail trade 
and services 
Manufacturi
ng 
Dependent variable OROA OROA OROA OROA OROA OROA OROA OROA 
Ln(immigrants) -0.010 
(0.008) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
Immigrant CEO -0.084 
(0.096) 
-0.087*** 
(0.033) 
-0.118*** 
(0.039) 
-0.051 
(0.033) 
-0.039 
(0.033) 
-0.110*** 
(0.040) 
-0.187*** 
(0.075) 
-0.027 
(0.042) 
Ln(immigrants)*immigrant 
CEO 
0.012 
(0.011) 
0.015*** 
(0.006) 
0.022*** 
(0.005) 
0.009 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
0.020*** 
(0.005) 
0.030*** 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
χ
2 
value for differences between 
samples 
χ
2 
=0.07 χ
2 
=3.17* χ
2 
=3.48* χ
2 
=5.20** 
Ln(assets) 0.025*** 
(0.007) 
0.035*** 
(0.005) 
0.029*** 
(0.009) 
0.034*** 
(0.005) 
0.026*** 
(0.004) 
0.046*** 
(0.007) 
0.037*** 
(0.008) 
0.028*** 
(0.007) 
Ln(debt) -0.011*** 
(0.003) 
-0.015*** 
(0.003) 
-0.013*** 
(0.005) 
-0.014*** 
(0.002) 
-0.010*** 
(0.002) 
-0.022*** 
(0.004) 
-0.016*** 
(0.004) 
-0.015*** 
(0.004) 
Ln(age) 0.010 
(0.013) 
0.010* 
(0.006) 
-0.0003 
(0.014) 
0.014** 
(0.006) 
0.011 
(0.007) 
0.011 
(0.009) 
0.010 
(0.011) 
0.029*** 
(0.011) 
Ln(country GDP per capita) -0.011 
(0.001) 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.017* 
(0.010) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.015** 
(0.007) 
-0.015** 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
Ln(region GDP per capita) -0.040*** 
(0.014) 
-0.020** 
(0.009) 
-0.088*** 
(0.027) 
-0.017* 
(0.009) 
0.0003 
(0.013) 
-0.013 
(0.019) 
-0.050*** 
(0.018) 
-0.012 
(0.015) 
Constant 0.099 
(0.196) 
-0.107 
(0.096) 
0.717*** 
(0.219) 
-0.126 
(0.094) 
-0.191 
(0.134) 
0.163 
(0.173) 
  
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.076 0.054 0.123 0.048 0.040 0.077 0.067 0.074 
N 1,881 8,129 1,369 7,970 5,276 4,063 2,585 1,222 
a) Standard errors are clustered on country-region. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Variation in sample size 
across specifications is due to differences in data availability for the variables of interest. 
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Table 8. Robustness Checks
a 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Controlling 
for the stock 
of the home-
country firms 
in the region 
Majority-
owned and 
wholly owned 
foreign firms 
<50 
employees 
≥50 
employees 
Immigrant 
share 
Immigrant 
flow 
Dependent variable OROA OROA OROA OROA OROA OROA 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Ln(immigrants) 0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
  
Ln(stock of home-country 
firms) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
     
Ln(immigrants)* 
100 percent foreign 
 0.001 
(0.001) 
    
100 percent foreign  0.003 
(0.006) 
    
Ln(immigrant share)     0.059** 
(0.030) 
 
Ln(immigrant flow)      0.005*** 
(0.001) 
Ln(asset) 0.016*** 
(0.002) 
0.016*** 
(0.002) 
0.010*** 
(0.001) 
0.028*** 
(0.005) 
0.016*** 
(0.002) 
0.016*** 
(0.002) 
Ln(debt) -0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.018*** 
(0.005) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
Ln(age) 0.027*** 
(0.003) 
0.027*** 
(0.003) 
0.021*** 
(0.004) 
0.023*** 
(0.004) 
0.028*** 
(0.003) 
0.027*** 
(0.003) 
Ln(country GDP per capita)  -0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.008** 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.002) 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
Ln(region GDP per capita)  -0.014** 
(0.006) 
-0.018*** 
(0.004) 
-0.020*** 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.011** 
(0.004) 
-0.016*** 
(0.004) 
Constant -0.051 
(0.077) 
-0.019 
(0.063) 
0.124** 
(0.051) 
-0.106* 
(0.055) 
-0.064 
(0.068) 
-0.022 
(0.064) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.040 0.040 0.021 0.063 0.039 0.039 
N 57,651 57,651 35,926 15,946 57,651 57,651 
a) Standard errors are clustered on country-region. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 
1% respectively. 
Sample: Models 3 and 4 have slightly fewer observations because employment data were unavailable for 
some firm-years. 
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Table 9. Importing and Non-importing Firms
a
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Importing 
behavior as a 
proxy for 
product type 
Controlling 
for 
importing 
behavior 
100% foreign 
ownership as 
a proxy for 
product type 
Controlling 
for 100% 
foreign 
ownership 
Dependent variable OROA OROA OROA OROS 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Ln(immigrants) 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
Ln(immigrants)*entrepreneur 0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
Entrepreneur 0.044* 
(0.024) 
0.068** 
(0.026) 
0.025 
(0.016) 
0.040** 
(0.018) 
Immigrant CEO  0.009 
(0.009) 
 0.011 
(0.010) 
Ln(immigrants)*immigrant CEO  -0.002 
(0.002) 
 -0.001 
(0.002) 
Entrepreneur*immigrant CEO  -0.082** 
(0.033) 
 -0.087*** 
(0.032) 
Ln(immigrant)*entrepreneur*immigrant CEO  0.014*** 
(0.005) 
 0.013*** 
(0.005) 
Entrepreneur*importing -0.018 
(0.026) 
-0.020 
(0.025) 
  
Ln(immigrants)*entrepreneur*importing -0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
  
Entrepreneur*100 percent foreign   0.018 
(0.027) 
0.032 
(0.026) 
Ln(immigrants)*entrepreneur*100 percent foreign   0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
Ln(immigrants)*importing 0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
  
Importing 0.010 
(0.007) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
  
Ln(immigrants)*100 percent foreign   -0.0002 
(0.001) 
-0.0002 
(0.001) 
100 percent foreign   0.003 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
Control variables Ln(assets), ln(debt), ln(age), ln(country GDP per capita), 
ln(region GDP per capita) 
Constant 0.035 
(0.101) 
0.036 
(0.099) 
-0.105* 
(0.057) 
-0.106* 
(0.055) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.045 0.045 0.042 0.043 
N 57,113 57,113 57,651 57,651 
a) Standard errors are clustered on country-region. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 
1% respectively. 
Sample: Models 1 and 2 include firms with available importing information. 
